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The Supreme Court of the United States, in Barren v. Baltimore
(1833), declared that the Bill of Bights was intended to protect the
civil rights of the individual from encroachment by the Federal
Government and not from state governments* This decision meant that
there was no constitutional grant upon which individual liberty could
"be guaranteed against infringement by the various states* The
Fourteenth Amendment was formulated and passed to remedy this
situation.
The purpose of this amendment particularly, th© first section, was
to apply the guarantees of the Bill of Sights to state activities
endangering civil rights* However, it was a long time before the
Supreme Court began to interpret the Fourteenth Amendment in accord
with its intended purpose*
Historically, the Fourteenth Amendment has been subject to
various interpretations. A number of studies have been made on the
application of the amendment to corporations and the Negro* This
study differs from those in that it is a specialized investigation of
the Fourteenth Amendment as an instrument in the protection of civil
rights. Various writers have treated some aspect or another of this
subject. Some of the outstanding writers in this area are the
following: Sobert K. Carr, Charles Warren, Pendleton Howard, fiobert
E. Cushman, Edward S. Corwin, and C. Herman Pritchett,
This study is an attempt to examine the Supreme Court's
interpretation and application of the Fourteenth Amendment between
1873 and 1949 to determine the extent to which it has "been used to
iii
protect the civil rights of individuals from state action. Consequently,
this investigation is primarily concerned with the Fourteenth Amendment,
civil rights, state action and the Supreme Court.
The chief sources for this study are a number of selected cases
from the United States Beports. decided "between 1873 to 1949. In
addition to this many secondary sources, especially law reviews, have
"been used to supplement ths writers interpretation and analysis of those
cases. The writer does not profess to have read all cases that came
before the Supreme Court during this period which might have had some
"bearing upon this study.
The writer is greatly indebted to the direction and guidance given
■by his advisor, Professor William M. Boyd. To Professor Bofcert H.
Brisbane, Jr., the writer is grateful for reading the manuscript and
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fhe American people have come to cherish certain fundamental
freedoms — freedom ef speech and of press, freedom of religion, the
rights of assembly and petition, and the right of one accused of crime
to fair and just treatment. As a matter of historical evolution th©
average American has b@en inclined to regard the state itself as th®
great enemy of these fundamental freedoms which are more commonly known
as civil rights. Consequently, there has been a reliance upon written
guarantees, enforced by the courts, as a means whereby the civil rights
of the individual could be protected against governmental encroachment.
Due t© the complexity of the American federal form of government it has
become necessary to maintain tw© constitutional protectors of civil
rights? the Bill of Bights directed against the national government on
the one hand and the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution ©f the
3
United States against the state® on the other.
fhe experience of the American colonists with English rule led te
the adoption of written guarantees or "bills ©f rights* designed t©
4
protect the individual against the state. These instruments varied in
lH©bert K. Carr, fglgggijPrqtection of Civil.lights^Quest of
(Ithaca, 1947), p. 3.
3Frederic A. Ogg and P. Oman Bay, Introduction to American
government, (New York, 1945), p. 137.
4Osm®nd K. Fraenkel, rhg Civil Liberties (New York, 1944), p. 1.
z
language from state to state, tut the provisions were identical in
substance and were concerned with two main objectives: the protection
of free expression of opinion, secular as well as religious, and the
5
prohibition of abuses of criminal law*
When the proposed United States Constitution was before the states
for ratification, the fear of governmental infringement upon the civil
rights of the individual was "brought int© the open. As the price of
ratification, a number of states (especially Pennsylvania, New York and
6
Virginia) recommended the adoption of a national Dill of rights. Those
recommendations had historical justification because "Bills of Bights
are for the most part reactions against evils of the past rather than
promises for the future." This agitation was attacked "by Alexander
Hamilton and others on the basis that the proposed federal government was
8
one of the delegated powers. However, the argument of the states
prevailed and when the first Congress convened seventeen amendments in
the nature of a "bill of rights were proposed. Of the proposed number,
twelve were adopted and ten were finally ratified lay the states. It is
interesting to note that one of the proposed seventeen provided that "no
state should infringe the right of trial by jury in criminal cases, nor
10
the rights of conscience, nor the freedom of speech or of press* *
Ogg and Hay, ,§£*£££.•» PP» 31-33.
7William Seagle in a "book review in the Nation, September 30, 1944,
p. 388.
a Federalists, no. 84.
E. Cushman, Leading Constitutional Decisions (8th ed«, New
York, 1947) p. 60.
10
Ibid.. p. ?.
The fact that the Bill of Bights was directed against the National
government is indicated by the language of the First Amendment, for it
"begins, "Congress shall make no law....11 The guarantees enumerated in
the first ten amendments to the Constitution of the United States are
'below.
The First Amendment guarantees freedom of religion, speech, press
and assembly. The Second and Third deal with military problems which
ware important when the Constitution was adopted, 'but are now largely
11
obsolete. The Fourth Amendment protects the security of the individual
"aaainat unreasonable searches and eeizers." The next two amendments -
12
the Fifth and Sixth - are concerned with criminal prosecutions. The
Fifth provides that no "capital, or otherwise infamous crime" shall be
prosecuted except upon indictment by a grand Jury, prohibits self-
incrimination and second prosecution for the same offense. Also
incorporated in the Fifth Amendment is the "due process of the law"
13
clause. which along with its companion clause of the Fourteenth
14
Amendment is the most important clause of the Constitution. The Sixth
Amendment guarantees trial by Jury, the right of counsel and to
confrontation by witnesses. The Seventh provides for Jury trials in
*lFraenkel, op.cit., p. 2.
l3What "due process of law" means today is the result of the
historical evolution of this clause. Originally, it meant simply the
modes of procedure which were due at common law, especially in
connection with the accusation and trial of supposed offenders. But
today "due process of law" has a different meaning. It has come to mean
what a majority of the Supreme Court finds to be reasonable law and
procedure. That is, it has come to mean the "approval" of the Court.
See Edward Corwin, The Constitution and What It Means Today (Baltimore,
1942), pp. 153-54.
raenkel, o_p,. cil», p* 2.
4
civil cases involving more than twenty dollars,, The Eighth along with
the Fourth, Fifth and Sixth amendments go to make up a "bill of rights11
IS
for accused people* It prohibits excessive bail and cruel and unusual
treatments* The last two amendments - the Ninth and Tenth <» reserve to
the states and people all powers not expressly conferred on the National
16
government.
As a matter of classification the Bill of Sights falls into two
17
parts* One part pertains to "facts and essence1* of freedom -
substantive rights - and the other part relates to the methods by which
freedom is protected—procedural rights, ill of the provisions of the
16
Bill of Sights protect aliens as well as citizens.
Historical evidence made it perfectly clear that the framere of the
Bill of Bights intended that it would restrain only the actions of the
National government. Nevertheless, it came to b© argued that these
guarantees of civil liberty ought to be construed as restraints upon the
19
states as well as upon the Federal government. That was the issue
Involved in the last ease in which Chief Justice John Marshall
20
participated, Barron v. Baltimore. In delivering the majority ©pinion
©f the Court, the Chief Justice pointed out that the first ten amendments
"contain no expression indicating an intention to apply them to the
21
State governments." In expressing the opinion of the Court, Marshall
l<*0gg and Hay, on.cit.. p. 140.
l8Fraenkel, op.cit.. p. 2.
19
Cuehman, op«cit.. p. 61.
30? Peters 243 (1833).
5
further stated:
We are of the opinion that the provision in the fifth Amendment te
the Constitution, declaring that private property shall not fee taken
for public use without just compensation, is intended solely as a
limitation on the exercise of power by the government of the United
States, and is not applicable to the legislation of the states.22
Although the decision in Barron v. Baltimore established firmly the
nature and scope of the Bill of Bights, the struggle to protect the civil
rights of the individual against state action did not end there. With
the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, after the Civil War, a new
23
constitutional "basis was provided upon which this struggle was resumed.
The Fourteenth Amendment was not the result of a spontaneous
creation. It was the product of many minds and the culmination of an
24
evolutionary process. The first step in the evolution of the Fourteenth
Amendment came with the passage of the Freedma^s Bureau Dill on February
25
19, 1866. President Johnson vetoed this "bill and Congress sustained
the veto. That setback did not mean total defeat for the "radical
republicans." In March, 1866, the Civil Bight Bill, an act which
attempted to guarantee federal protection of the civil rights of Negroes,
26
was passed. The first section of that act - later incorporated into
88Ipl.a. The decision in Barron v. Baltimore had the force of law
until 1931, when it was Tsy-passed, however, not reversed. See Near v.
Minnesota, 383 U. S. 697 (19S1).
, op.oit.. p. 10.
24Horace E. Flack, The Adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment
(Baltimore, 1908), p. 55.
2SThe new Freedman's Bureau bill was designed to do two things: To
extend the life of the Bureau indefinitely, and to extend federal
lurisdiction over the civil rights of Negroes. Alfred H. Kelley and
Winfred HarDison, The American Constitution. Its Origin and Developmenj
(New York, 1948), p. 459.
6
the Fourteenth Amendment - declared that "all persons born in the United
States and not subject to any foreign power, excluding Indian not taxed,H
2?
were citizens of the United States* A number of congressmen,
especially Representative John A. Bingham (Hep., Ohio), considered the
Civil Rights hill unconstitutional and recommended a constitutional
amendment to preserve the guarantees stipulated therein* Consequently,
28
the Fourteenth Amendment was drawn up and presented to the states*
The first section of the Fourteenth Amendment dealt with civil rights*
Due to the interpretation given it and the extent to which it has been
invoked, this section has achieved an importance out of all proportion to
29
the other four sections* Much can he discovered as to the intended
meaning and purpose from the comments of its sponsor, Representative
John A* Bingham*
Representative Bingham, in formulating Section One of the Fourteenth
Amendment sought to get around the decision of Barron v. Baltimore "by
oroviding a constitutional means of extending the Bill of Rights t©
30
persons who might "be oppressed "by the state. Upon re-examination of
27Ibid.
2%he question of who is the author of the Fourteenth Amendment has
not "been settled. Two notable contenders are Judge Stephen Neale and
Robert Dale Owen, both of Indiana. However, the evidence points to
Representative John A. Bingham as the author of Section One. See Flack,
op.cit.. pp. 69-71.
2^Carl B. Swisher, American Constitutional Development (Boston, 1943),
p. 329*
^Congressional Globe. 39th Congress, 1st Session pp. 1089-1090. Joint
Resolution H.R. 63, proposing the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution
of the United States, was first brought before the National House of
Representatives on February 28, 1866. Mr. Davis of New York was entitled
to the floor. He delivered a lengthly speech opposing the proposed
amendment. Mr. Davis was followed by Representative Woodrigge of Vermont
who spoke in defense of the resolution. Thereafter, Representative John
A. Bingham of Ohio, the author of the first section of the proposed
amendment, obtained the floor. Excerpts from his speech are given below:
th@ Barron v, Baltimore ruling, Section One was phrased so as to make
31
it conform with the Fifth Amendment* Bingham, an ardent defender of
civil rights for all people, made it clear that the proposed amendment
was not limited to the protection of the rights of Negroes, "but extended
33
to the rights of white citizens as well.
The Fourteenth Amendment as reported from the joint committee on
33
Reconstruction made no attempt to define citizenship* The House
accepted it in the original form, tut the Senate deemed it advisable
to add the following clause: "All persons born in the United States,
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United
34
States and of the state wherein they reside." That clause did the
following things: remedied the lack of citizenship clause in the
original Constitution; made national citizenship primary and state
"A gentleman.. .wanted to know if I could cite a decision showing
that the power of the Federal Government to enforce in the United States
Courts the "bill of rights [against state action] under the articles of
amendment* I answered that I was prepared to introduce such decisions;
and that is exactly what makes plain the necessity of adopting this
amendment.... I refer the House and the country to Barron v. The Mayor
and City Council of Baltimore involving the question whether the
provisions of the Fifth article of amendments to the Constitution are
"binding upon the State of Maryland and t© be enforced in the Federal
courts £jMr. Bingham cited Chief Justice Marshall's opinion which held
that the Bill of Bights could not be enforced against state action* He
then stated that the individual was without remedy in respect to state
encroachmentSdf." See Congratsional Slobef 39th Cong.,1st session,,
pp. 1084-1095; also Flack, oo.oit.. pp. 58-59,
31
Congressional GHobe. 39th Gong, 1st Sess,, pp. 1089-1090.
^In answer to a statement that the Fourteenth Amendment was "aimed
simply and purely toward the protection of 'American citizens of African
descent1...," Mr, Bingham replied that the amendment was proposed to
protect "loyal white citizens" also. See Cong, Globe, 39th Cong., 1st
session, p. 1065.
33Ibid.. pp. 2500, 2542.
34
Tbid., pp. 2890«-9?, See also Swisher, op.cit., pp. 333,
8
35
secondary; and reversed Dred Scott decision.
The three remaining clauses of Section One guaranteed civil rights
against state interference:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law, nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the law.
These provisions have been subject to varied meanings and
interpretations. By "privilege or immunities of citizens of the United
States" the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment meant the whole body of
36
civil rights enumerated in the Bill of Rights to the federal Constitution*
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court refused to accept this interpretation
3?
in the Slaughterhouse Cases. The "due process of law" clause was
borrowed from the Fifth Amendment. The same injunction which was directed
38
against the Federal government was now applied to the states. The
"equal protection of the laws" clause seemed to re-enforce the Civil
39
Bights act and warned the states not to discriminate against Negroes.
However, this does not rule out legislative classifications such as
40
segregated railroad accommodations. Contrary to the intention of its
35E9lly and Harbison, sMaSH*» P« 461»
36Conff. Globe. 39th Cong. 1st session, pp. 2543, 3765-66. See also
Cushman, op.cit., p. 41.
3?16 Wallace 36 (1873).
38
Cone,. Globe. 39th Cong, ,1st Session, p. 33766.
In reference to the equal protection of the laws clause Senator
Howard stated that it "abolishes all caste legislation in the states
and goes away with the injustices of subjecting one caste of persons to
a code note applicable to another. 0ong. Globe. 39th Cong., 1st session,
p. 2766. See also Kelly and Harbison, op.eit.. p. 461.
v. Ferguson, 163 U. S. 537 (1897).
9
framers, the equal protection clause has come to be used to protect
41
business interests from state regulation.
It is significant to note that the civil rights guaranteed by the
first section of the Fourteenth Amendment are not new ideas of law and
justice. They are as old as the Magna Charta and were eocibodied in the
constitutions of the states "before the adoption of the federal
43
Constitution* The one new thing about this amendment is that it
shifted protection of civil rights from the states to the Federal
43
government* Unfortunately, the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees no
44
rights against invasion "by private individuals or groups*
The foregoing material has been concerned only with Section One
of the Fourteenth Amendment* It must not be forgotten that there were
four sections to this amendment. These sections had contemporary
45
importance and were political in nature. Sections two and three dealt
with the problem of Southern representation. Section two, which provided
for a reduction of the representation of states in the House in proportion
to the number of persons disfranchised, was termed the most important
46
section of the Fourteenth Amendment by Thaddeus Stevens. The fourth
4lAndrew C. Mclaughlin, "The Court, the corporation, and Conkling,"
Historical Review, XLvl (October, 1940), 50.
42Charles Collins, "The Failure of the Fourteenth Amendment as a




44The Fourteenth Amendment is directed only against state action.
The Fifteenth Amendment is enforceable against both the Federal and
state governments. Only the Thirteenth Amendment is enforceable against
both the Federal and State governments and also private persons. Milton
H. Kbnvita, The Constitution and Civil Bights. (Hew York, 1947), p. 30*




Section guaranteed the United States debt and outlawed the Confederate
47
debt. The fifth and final section empowered Congress to enforce the
48
amendment by appropriate legislation.
In the preceeding pages there has been an attempt to give a brief
historical retrospect of the plight of Federal protection of civil rights
from the adoption of the Bill of Bights through the adoption of the
Fourteenth Amendment. First, there was a recapitulation of the evolution
of the Bill of Rights. It was pointed out that the Supreme Court put an
end to efforts to persuade the Court to apply the Bill of Bights to state
action (Barren v. Baltimore}. Finally, the evolution, nature, scope, and
purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment were considered. Special emphasis
was placed on the fact that Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment was
formulated for the expressed purpose of extending the Bill of Bights to
state activities endangering civil rights. The remaining chapters of
this study deal with the Fourteenth Amendment before the Supreme Court
and the extent to which the Court has interpreted that amendment in
accordance with the intention of its framers and the people who voted
for it.
Kelly and Harbison, op.CjJ». . p. 463.
The Supreme Court has never conclusively determined the full
extent of fc*e power of Congress under Section Five. In the famous
Civil Bights Cases (109 0, 3. 3) the Court held void an act of Congress
on the gromd that the prohibitions of the opening section of the
Fourteenth Amendment were intended to reach postive acts of State
authorities and not acts of private individuals or acts of omission by
the State itself, Corwin, op.feit.. pp. 184-85.
CHAPTER II
NARROW INTIRFHITATIOH, 1873 - 1932
A great many of the congressmen who voted for the Fourteenth
Amendment thought as its framers did, that it would, somehow, make the
first eight amendments Binding upon the states* The debates in Congress
on this amendment pointed out that the intention of its framers was te
1
apply the Bill of Rights to state action endangering civil rights*
This was to "be done "by converting the privileges of state citizenship
into privileges of national citizenship. The power of enforcement of
the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment given Congress left the
2
Supreme Court with only an intermediary role in this respect. However,
the Supreme Court in 1868, and for a long time afterwards was not
3
prepared to accept the intended purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment* A
controlling majority of the Court felt it necessary to react against the
extreme centralising tendency of the Reconstruction program of the
"radical republicans11 on the ground that it sought to undermine the
4
"federal equilibrium". As a result the Court refused to accept an
intermediary role ana. set out to protect the federal system* However,
Congressional Slobe, 39th Cong* 1st sees., pp. 1089, 2542,
2765-66.
2Bdward S. Corwin, Liberty Against Government (Baton Bouge, 1948),
pp. 118-19.
Edward S. Corwin, "The Supreme Court and the Fourteenth Amendment?
Michigan Law Review. VII (1909), 645-46.
11
IS
the Court's devotion t© the theory of federalism did not last very long.
After 1877 the Supreme Court began to reinterpret the Fourteenth
Amendment as a means of protecting business property.
A. The Slaughterhouse Cases And Privileges And Immunities
The Court was called upon for the first time to interpret the
essential nature and meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment five years after
5
its adoption. The Slaughterhouse Cases came about as a result of action
on the part of the state of Louisiana*
On March 8, 1869, the legislature of Louisiana passed an act which
granted to one corporation a monopoly of the slaughterhouse business in
6
an area of 1154 square miles around and including New Orleans. This
monopoly deprived over one thousand persons the right to engage in the
7
meat packing business. A number of butchers, acting in concert, brought
suit against this monopolistic grant on the grounds that it not only
abridged the privileges and immunities of citizenship of the United States,
but it deprived them of their property without due process of law, and
8
denied to them the equal protection of the law. John A. Campbell was
9
retained as chief counsel by the butchers. On April 14, 1873, Mr.
Justice Miller delivered the majority opinion of the Court (Justices
Slaughterhouse Case, 16 Wallace 36(1873), The first case in which
the applicability of the Fourteenth Amendment was urged was Worthy v.
Commissioners, 9 Wallace 611, but the Court dismissed the case for lack
of jurisdiction.




Charles Warren, Supreme Court and United States History, (Boston,
1928), II, pp. 536-37.
John A. Campbell had been a member of the Supreme Court at the
time of the Dred Scott case, but he resigned the post when his home state,
Alabama, left the Union. Corwin, Liberty Against Government, pp. 119-20.
13
Clifford, Davis Strong, and Hunt concurring). After having acknowledged
the Importance of the case at hand and the great responsibility of the
pending decision, the Court rejected the argument of Campbell. Although
this argument included three clauses of Section One of the Fourteenth
Amendment, the Court concerned itself mainly with the first clause which
stipulated that "No state shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States*1*
Following a consideration of the history of the Fourteenth Amendment
and the evils it sought to remedy, Justice Miller stated that "the one
pervading purpose" of this amendment (along with the Thirteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments) was to protect the newly made freedman from
10
oppression "by the white man. It was further pointed out that the
Fourteenth Amendment did not restrain the states in the exercise of
11
police power for public good.
In reviving the dual citizenship issue which arose in the Bred Scott
Case, the Court held that th© citizenship clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment recognized and reiterated th© distinction which had always
18
existed "between United States citizenship and state citizenship. By
the same token, the Court contended that the succeeding clause must "be
understood as distinguishing the privileges and immunities of the
13
citizens of the United States from those of state citizenship.
10
Slaughterhouse Cases, 16 Wallace 36(1873), p. 71.
1XItidg. p. 66.
13The words privileges and immunities*1 occurred for the first time
In American Constitutional history in the fourth of the articles of
Confederation. In the Constitution of the United States there is a
clause (Art. IV, Sec. 3) which reads as follows! "The citizens of each
state shall be entitled to all the privileges or immunities of citizens
of the several states."
14
After setting up this distinction, th© Court declared that only
the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States fell
14
•under the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment* However, no
conclusive attempt was made to define what privileges and immunities of
15
national citizenship included* In regard to the due process clause
Justice Miller declared;
It is sufficient to say that under no construction of the provision
that we have ever seen, or any that we deem admissible, can the
restraint imposed by the state of Louisiana upon the exercise of
their trade by the butchers of Hew Orleans be held to be a
deprivation of property within the meaning of that provision. 16
The majority opinion was unacceptable to the four judges - Associate
17
Justices Field, Swayne, Bradley, and Chief Justice Chase, These
dissenting judges insisted that th® fundamental rights of citizens were
18
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment against state encroachment* They
further pointed out that the narrow interpretation of the majority
19
rendered this amendment ineffective. The decision in the Slaughterhouse




In reference to privileges and immunities of citizens of the United
States the Courts referred to Crandall v. Nevarda, 6 Wallace 35(1368),
which held that privileges and immunities owe Btheir existence to the
Federal Government, its National character, its Constitution, or its laws."
^Slaughterhouse Cases, 16 Wallace 36(1373), pp. 80-31.
The interpretation advocated by the dissenting justices was similar
to some of the arguments in Congress when the Fourteenth Amendment was up
for discussion. See Cong. 61obe. 39th Cong., 1st sess., pp. 3543,3765t66.
^Slaughterhouse Cases, 16 Wallace 36(1873), pp,95»100, 123.
t pp. 94, 125. See also Andrew 0. McLaughlin, A Constitutional
Hiatnry of the United States (New York, 1933), p. 730.
Warren, qp.cit., p. 535.
15
Following the Slaughterhouse cases the Court was able to maintain a
firm policy because, from 1873 to 1881, there were but two vacancies and
more than a majority of the judges served throughout this period. In
1375, one year after Morrison B. Waite became Chief Justice, th® Court
affirmed its adherence to the narrow construction of the Fourteenth
22
Amendment as outlined in the Slaughterhouse cases. This case, Minor v*
Happersett, came before the Supreme Court on a writ of error. Virginia
Minor had been denied the right to vote on the basis that she was not a
23
male citizen. She brought suit against the registrar, Happersett, on
the ground that this act was an abridgement of the privileges and
34
immunities of citizens of the United States. The Court rejected
Minor's argument stating that the right of suffrage was not one of th©
privileges and immunities of citizenship before the adoption of the
Fourteenth Amendment and this amendment did not add to those privileges
25
and Immunities. It provided for additional protection of the civil
26
rights that citizens already had before its adoption.
In spite of the Court's continued adherence to doctrines of the
Slaughterhouse cases, protection was still sought under the privilege®
81Juatice David Davis resigned in January, 1877, to become Senator
from Illinois. John Marshall Harlan was appointed to fill his place.
In 1880 Justice Strong resigned and William D. Woods of Georgia was
appointed to fill this vacancy. Woods waa the first judge from the
South since the appointment of Judge Campbell in 1852. See Cortesi A. M,
Ewing, The JMge4j3f_thi_Sup.reme Courtt_1789-T937^ A Study of their
^^^^Wli, 1938, pp. 23-24, 97.







and immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The same was true of
37
the Walker v, Sauvlnet. In that case Walker was tried and convicted
fey a judge under a Louisiana statmte which provided for trial fey a judge
2(
in the event that the jury did not agree and failed to render a verdict.
Following his conviction and sentence, Walker sued out a writ of error to
the United States Supreme Court on the ground that the proceedings in
the state court was a direct violation of the privileges and immunities
29
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court rejected this argument
and affirmed the judgement of the state court declaring;
A trial fey jury in suits at common law [guaranteed fey the Seventh
Amendments pending in State Courts is not, therefore, a privilege
or inmunity of national citizenship, which the states are forbidden
fey the Fourteenth Amendment to abridge.3®
After 1876 it feecame evident that the privileges and immunities
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, as interpreted fey the Supreme Court
afforded slight protection of the civil rights of individuals. Only the
Mdue process of law0 clause remained as a constitutional feasis from
31
Federal protection of civil rights. Consequently, litigants and their
counsel feegan to use the "due process" clause as an instrument of appeal
to the Supreme Court.
B. Due Process of Laws Procedural And Substantive
The changes in tactics on the part of appellants to persuade the
27





Ibid. . p. 92.
"^Benjamin F. Wright, The Growth pf^Amsrican Constitutional miLaw
(New York, 1942), p. 151.
Supreme Court to use the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
to protect civil rights against state action was resisted in the
beginning. Those persons who sought favorable decisions in this respect
argued that the word "liberty11 (and some time the word "life**) in the
clause - "nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law;* - should be interpreted to
3«
Include any and all of the civil rights enumerated in the Bill of Sights*
That is, those persons who sought protection against state interference
with life or liberty were generally concerned with the question whether
or not there had been a lack of "due process1* in methods of judicial or
33
administrative procedure* That was to be distinguished from "due
process" as a means of protection from state interference with property*
However, between 1877 and 1898 the Court was more concerned with s
substantive due process and the protection of business property than it
was with protection of personal liberties*
In 1884 the Court was called upon to decide whether or not there
had been a violation of due process of law with respect to just
34
procedure in a state court* In the case, Hurtado v. California, one
Joseph Hnrtado was indicted, tried, convicted and sentenced to death
on a murder charge* Prior to the trial he had been indicted under a
provision of the California Constitution which authorized prosecutions
for felonies by information, after examination and commitment by a
35
magistrate, without indictment by a grand jury,
32Carr, pp_»cil«, p. 11.
33Warren, op.cit.. p. 568.
34Hurtado v. California, 110 U. S. 516(1884).
35.
13
Hurtado through his counsel instigated an appeal to the Supreme
Court on the ground that he had been tried and illegally convicted without
36
an indictment "by a grand jury. And if executed he would be deprived
of his life and liberty without due process of law as guaranteed by tooth
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
The ©pinion of the Court was begun with a brief historical retrospect
of the evolution of the due process of law clause. That clause was
traced from the Magna Charta down to its incorporation in the Fifth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States* In upholding the
action of the state the Court helds that the due process clause of the
Fifth Amendment was not intended to include the institution and procedure
of grand Jury in any case, and the due process clause of the Fourteenth
37
Amendment means the same as the one in the Fifth* Furthermore, the
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was intended only to
secure "those fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie
38
at the base of all our civil and political institutions*"
Mr. Justice Harlan refused to accept the majority opinion* He
dissented on the grounds that the similarity of the due process clauses
39
of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments was not accidental* Justice
BarIan went on to point out that the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment was intended to impose the same kind of restraints upon the states
40




39'Hurtado v. California,110 U.S. 516(1884), p. 541.
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41
of the Court in this case was in keeping with an earlier decision, in
which the Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment did not provide for
uniformity of law throughout the United States because each state
prescribes its own modes of judicial proceedingBe
In addition to seeking protection under procedural due process,
there were numerous attempts to persuade the Supremo Court to accept
substantive due process and the protection of "business property between
1877 and 1897. In the beginning the Court had refused to accept the
argument that corporations could seek protection under the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In the Slaughterhouse eases (1873)
42
the majority apparently assumed that due process meant due procedure,
but the dissenting justices, especially swayne and Bradley, insisted
upon a broader interpretation of the due process clause*
43
In 1877, in Munn v« Illinois, the Supreme Court was presented with
an opportunity to consider the applicability of substantive due process*
That case arose out of an act passed by the Granger-controlled legislature
of Illinois fixing the rates for storage of grain in warehouses located
in cities of one hundred thousand population or more. The grain elevator
operators challenged the constitutionality of the statute on the grounds
that it was an infringement upon the power of Congress to regulate
interstate commerce and that it violated the due process clause of the
44
Fourteenth Amendment*
The majority opinion, presented by Mr. Chief Justice Waits, upheld
Missouri v. Lewis, 101 U.S. 22(1379), pp. 22-31.
42
Wright, opaCit., p« 99.




the state law. The Chief Justice pointed out that when private property
45
is devoted to public use it is subject to public regulation. Following
this decision the "business interest began a widespread campai$i t©
protect its interests. First, it got corporation attorneys elected to
46
state legislatures. Secondly, "business interests carried its fight to
the courts, where, after a long fight, it won a substantial victory in
the Court»s acceptance substantive due process in cases dealing with
47
governmental restrictions upon private property.
The rise of substantive due process in the United States was made
possible through the Court*s acceptance of the business corporation as
ft ^person" under the Fourteenth Amendment, It is interesting to note
that in 1883 Eoscoe Gonklin$one of the members of a Joint Committee
on Reconstruction which drew up the Fourteenth Amendment, argued before
the Supreme Court that the Fourteenth Amendment was intended to give
48
protection to corporate property as well as to civil rights, Conkling
in his advocacy of this conspiracy theory was on weak ground because
the secret journal of the Joint Committee gives little or no evidence to
49
support his contention.
After 1890, the Supreme Court decided a number of cases which
indicated the trend in substantive due process. Outstanding among these
4SIbid.. p. 126.
4%elly and Harbison, ©j>aC||j,, p. 510,
47rbid.
48
San Mateo County v. Southern fi. H. Co., 116 U,Sa 138(1882).
^. B. Kendrick (©a.), The Journal of the Joint Committee, on
HeeonBtruction (New York, 1914), pp. £1,54,55,61,87,98,99,106: See ale©
Howard J. Graham, "The Conspiracy Theory of the Fourteenth Ammendment",
Yale Law Journal. XLVII (1938).
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50 51
eases ares the Minnesota rate commission case, Allgeyer v. Louisiana,
52 53 54
Holden v* Hardy, Lochaer v. New York, and Muller v. Oregon.
The Minnesota rate case originated out of the controversy caused by
a state statute which set up a rate commission with final authority in
rate fixing. Speaking through Mr. Justice Blachford, the Court held
the Minnesota statute unconstitutional on the ground that it deprived
the railroad of its rights under the due process clause to have a
55
judicial determination of the reasonableness of rates.
56
In 1897, in Allgeyer v. Louisiana,, the Supreme Court set forth
the liberty of contract doctrine. That case involved a statute which
forbade any person in Louisiana from making a contract for marine
insurance with a firm which had not complied with laws of the state.
In delivering the opinion of a unanimous court, Mr. Justice Peckham stated!
The liberty mentioned in that amendment [the Fourteenth! means
not only the right of the citizen to be free from the mere
physical restraint of his person, as by incarceration, but the
term is deemed to embrace the right of the citizen to be free in
the enjoyment of all of his faculties-, to be free to use them in
all lawful waysj to live and to work where he will; to earn his
livelihood by any lawful calling} to pursue any livelihood or
avocation, and for that purpose to enter into all contracts which
may be proper, necessary and essential to his carrying out to a
successful conclusion the purpose above mentioned."7
^Chicago, Milwaukee and St, Paul By. Co. v. Minnesota, 134 U.S.
418(1890).
51165 U. S. 578(1897).
52169 U. S. 366(1898),
53198 U. S. 45(1905).
U. S. 412(1908).
55C5Chicago Milwaukee and St. Paul By. Co. v. Minnesota, 134 U.S.
418(1890).
56Ibid.. p. 589.
The Liberty of contract doctrine was not fully accepted "by the Court
58
-until some years later. In 1898, in Holden v. Hardy, the Supreme Court
sustained an eight-hour law and refused to invoke the liberty of contract*
59
However, in Lochner v. New York, the Court declared unconstitutional a
New York law limiting the hours of labor in a "bakery shop to sixty hours
in one week or ten hours in any one day, Mr. Justice Peckham, speaking
for the majority, cited the right of free contract established in
Allgeyer v. Louisiana (1897), and held that the right to purchase or sell
labor was an important part of the liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth
60
Amendment. Justices Harlan, White, Day and Holmes dissented. In
denouncing the majority opinion Justice Holmes wrote?
This case is decided upon an economic theory which a large part of
the country does not entertain.... The Fourteenth Amendment doee not
enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics...a Constitution is not
to embody a particular economic theory, whether paternalism and
the organic relation of the citizen to the state or laisseg-faire.
It is made for people of fundamentally differing views, and the
accident of our finding certain opinion natural and familiar, or
novel and shocking, ought not to conclude our judgment upon the
question whether statutes embodying them conflict with the
Constitution of the United States.51
Apparently Justice Holmes1 dissenting opinion (along with the
"Brandtis brief") had some influence upon the other justices. Because
62
three years later, in Muller v. Oregon, the Court unanimously upheld
58169 U.S. 366(1898).
59198 U.S. 45 (1905).
JMi»» PP» 75-76. Justice Holmes' dissenting opinion in Locbner v.
New York was one of his greatest opinions. Between 1902 and 1932 he
dissented 173 times. But it was not the number of dissents that won for
Holmes the title of the Great Dissenter, because some of his colleagues
dissented more often than he did. It was the quality of Holmes1 dissents
that made them famous. See Catherine D. Bowen, Yankee From Olympus i
Justice Holmes and His Family (Boston, 1944), pp. 372-376, 456.
63308 U.S. 412 (1908).
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the constitutionality of an Oregon statute which prohibited the employment
of women in mechanical establishment, factories, and laundries for more
than ten hours in any one day.
The Supreme Court's preoccupation with the acceptance of substantive
due process and the protection of business property, between 187? and
1897, explains in part why so little attention was given to interpreting
the Fourteenth Amendment as an instrument of protecting civil rights.
However, the Court's concern with substantive due process reached its
63
peak from 1931-1930.
0. Following Old Paths, 1900 - 1923
The Supreme Court's narrow interpretation of the Fourteenth
Amendment as an instrument in the protection of civil rights against
64
state action continued until 1923. This trend will be analyzed in
65 66
seven cases? Maxwell v. Dow, West v. Louisiana, Patterson v.
67 68 69
Colorado, Twining v. New Jersey, Weeks v. United States, Gilbert v.
70 71
Minnesota, and Prudential v. Cheek.
Of the 141 cases in which state legislation was invalidated between
1921-1930, about two-thirds involved the Fourteenth Amendment. While
between 1899-1921, 94 of 1194 state statutes invalidated involved that
amendment. See Wright, op.cit., p. 113.
64
Carr, op.cit.. p. 11.
65 . &
176 0. S. 581 (1900).
66
194 U. S. 254 (1904).
67
205 U, S. 454 (1907).
68311 U. S. 78 (1908).
232 U. S. 383 (1914).
7°354 U. S. 325 (1920).
?1259 U. S. 530 (1922).
34
In 1900 the Court was called upon to reconsider the privileges and
72
immunities clause as a means of federal protection of civil rights.
This case involved modes of judicial procedure in the state of Utah.
The plantiff in error was indicted on information filed by the prosecutor
rather than "by grand jury, and subsequently tried and convicted by a
73
jury of eight people and sentenced to eighteen years imprisonment. He
then applied for a writ of habeas corpus on the ground that indictment
by information abridged the privileges and immunities of national
citizenship, and that the subsequent trial by a jury of eight rather
74
than of twelve deprived him of his liberty without due process of law.
The state denied the writ and an appeal was made to the Supreme Court of
the United States,
The opinion of the Supreme Court affirmed the action of the state
court. It by-passed the due process clause by stating that in a Federal
Court all indictments must be brought by a grand jury. This rule,
75
however, does not apply to prec@edings in state courts. Turning to
the privileges and immunities clause, the Court held that this clause
does not necessarily include all the rights enumerated in the first
76
eight amendments to the Constitution.
Mr. Justice Harlan in objecting to the majority opinion declared
73









bid,., pp. 583-85. The decision in this case put a final block
(at least until 1935) to all attempts to secure federal protection of
civil rights under the privileges and immunities clause. See Charles
Warren, "The New Liberty under the Fourteenth Amendment," Harvard Law
Haview. XXXIX (1936), 439.
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78
that conviction "by a jury of sight rather than a jury of twelve was a
77
violation of the federal Constitution. He denounced the Court's
interpretation as "being opposed to the plain words of the Constitution
and that it defeated the manifest objectives of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Justice Harlan's position indicates that he did not feel that the states
should be left individually to determine when their citizens had been
79
deprived of the fundamental rights of freedom.
Four years later, 1900, an appellant attempted to persuade the
Court to interpret the Fourteenth Amendment as a means of applying the
80
Sixth Amendment to state proceedings at common law. The Court rejected
this argument and upheld the action of the state - indictment by
information and subsequent imprisonment. In following its own precedence,
the Court ruled that the Sixth Amendment did not apply to criminal
81
proceedings in state courts. Furthermore, it pointed out that the
83
states could alter common law at any time.
Although the Court consistently interpreted the Fourteenth
Amendment contrary to its intended purpose, there were always justices
who refused to accept this construction. The extent to which those
dissenting opinions were in keeping with the purpose of the Fourteenth
was illustrated in Justice Harlan's dissenting opinion in Patterson v.
77Wxwell v. Dow, 176 D. S. 581 (1900), pp. 605-606.
78Ebid., p. 613.
no
Floyd B. Clark, The Constitutional Doctrines of Justice BarIan.
(Baltimore, 1915), p. 176.






Colorado. In that case, Patterson was charged with contempt of court
84
"because he refused to abide by an injunction. This injunction was
issued in an attempt to stop the publishing of certain articles which
reflected on the motives and conduct of the Supreme Court of Colorado
85
on cases still pending. An appeal was made by Patterson's counsel
to the Supreme Court of the United States declaring that the contempt
charge was in violation of the Federal Constitution because it abridged
86
freedom of speech and of press.
The Court accepted the argument of the state which held that
freedom of speech and of press were necessary in a republican form of
government, but they could not be carried to such an extreme so as to
87
unjustly influence the orderly administration of justice. The Court
refused to decide whether or not freedom of speech and press were
88
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice Harlan in refusing to
accept the position of the court declared:
I go further and hold that the privileges of free speech and free
press, belonging to every citizen of the United States, constitute
essential parts of every man's liberty, and are protected against
violation by the 14th Amendment forbidding a state to deprive any
person of his liberty without due process of law...*"*
In 1908 the Court was called upon to determine the applicability of
the self incrimination clause of the Fifth Amendment in a state court









proceeding* Albert C. Twining and his associate were indicted for
knowingly exhibiting a false report to a government examiner. When the
ease was tried, Twining heard accusations and testimonies made against
91
him, "but did not go upon the stand to deny those charges• In his
charge to the jury, the Judge made mention of the fact that the defendant
98
did not deny the direct charges made against him.
Twining*s counsel made an appeal to the United States Supreme Court
stating that the mere comment of the court upon the failure of the accused
to testify was a violation of both the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments,
93
because it compelled him to be a witness against himself. The Court
94
admitted that the action of the state constituted self»incrimination.
Contrary to this acknowledgement, the Court affirmed the act of the state
on the ground that exemption from compulsory self-incrimination in state
95
courts is secured by neither the Fifth nor Fourteenth Amendments* Mr*
Justice Harlan objected to the majority opinion in the following words:
I cannot support any judgment declaring immunity from self
incrimination is not one of the privileges or immunities of national
citizenship, nor a part of the liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment against hostile state action.»&
Undoubtedly it has been noticed that historically a majority of the
Court has, while refusing to apply the guarantees enumerated in the Bill
of Bights to state activities, insisted that the first eight amendments





to the Constitution are directed against the Federal Government* In
1914 the Court was presented with an opportunity to implement this
97
doctrine in the case of Weeks v. United States. Weeks, the defendant,
was arrest#d| hie home searched and personal possessions taken by police
98
officers without a warrant* This property was turned over to a
United States Marshall. The defendant then petitioned the Federal
District Court to recover his property and the court responded by
99
returning a portion of it* The portion of the property retained was
used as evidence against the defendant. Following conviction he appealed
the case to the Supreme Court on the contention that this act was in
100
violation of both the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the lower court stating
that it constituted unreasonable search and seizure and was, therefore,
101
in violation of the Fourth Amendment* In the same opinion, the Court
pointed out that the Fourth Amendment only protected the individual
against the Federal Government and its agencies and not against the
102
misconduct of state officers*
Although the Court's Interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment,
civil rights and state action was consistent down to 1922, it appeared
weakened in 1930, when the Court was called upon to consider the
103
constitutionality of a Minnesota anti-sedition statute* In sustaining
9?












Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U. S. 325 (1920).
29
the state statute as lawful limitation upon the freedom of speech, th®
Court alluded to the possibility of freedom of speech being protected
by the Fourteenth Amendment but did not pass on it. Chief Justice
104
White and Justice Brandeis dissented*
In 1920 the Supreme Court alluded to the possibility of th®
freedom of speech being protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. But in
105
1923, in the ease of Prudential Insurance Company v. Cheek, when
it decided upon the constitutionality of the Missouri letter law, it
reverted back to its old position. The opinion of the Court in upholding
the state law declared in no uncertain terms that "neither the
Fourteenth nor any ether provision of the Constitution of the United
States imposed upon the states any restraints about 'freedom of speech1 ,w
The foregoing material in this chapter has dealt with the Fourteenth
Amendment, civil rights, and state action before the Supreme Court of the
United States from 1873 to 1922* It served to highlight the fact that
for nearly fifty years the Court interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment
contrary to its framers* The framers of that Amendment had intended that
it would make the first eight amendments binding upon the states, but
the Court refused to accept that purpose. In the Slaughterhouse Cases
(1873) the privileges and immunities clause wag rendered ineffective
leaving only the due process clause as a contitutional basis for federal
protection of civil rights. In Hurtado v. California (1884), the due
106
l04It is interesting to note that in this case Chief Justice White
who had been a confederate drummer boy, supported national supremacy,
while Justice Holmes, who fought with the Union Army, upheld state
right®. See Chaffee, Jr., Free SpeechJLn,the United States (Cambridge,
1942) p. 290.




process clause as a means of protecting civil rights was knocked out*
However, "between 1877 and 1897 the Supreme Court was preoccupied with
the acceptance of a ■broadened conception of substantive due process as
a means of protecting business property. Between 1900 and 1922, the
Court consistently refused to revive either of these clauses of
protecting the personal rights of the individual against state interference.
But there were always Justices who refused to accept the construction of
the Fourteenth Amendment and it was interesting to notice to what extent
those dissenting opinions were to become majority opinions in the future*
CHAPTER III
CHANGE TOWARD A LIBERAL INTERPRCTATION, 1933-1936
In 1933 the Court began to retreat from the position which it had
held for fifty years in regard to the Fourteenth Amendment as an
instrument in the protection of civil rights against state action, The
changed attitude of the Court was the result of its acceptance of a
liberal conception of the word "liberty" in that clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment which reads: "nor shall any state deprive any person of life,
1
liberty, or property without due process of law." In addition to the
liberalization of the due process clause, the privileges and immunities
3
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was revived in 1935.
A. Liberal Conception of Due Process of Law
In 1923 the Court was called upon to consider the constitutionality
of a Nebraska statute which prohibited the teaching of a modern foreign
3
language to children in the first eight grades. The appellant in that
ease, an instructor in a private school, was arraigned for teaching
German to a student who had not successfully passed the eighth grade.
Following the conviction the appellant filed an appeal to the Supreme
Court upon the premise that the right to choose and pursue a lawful
Cushman, og^cit., p. 101
«
Pendleton Howard, "The Privileges and Immunities of Federal
citizenship and Colgate v. Harvey, "University of Pennsylvania Law
Review, LXXXVII (1939), 362.




vocation was within the rights guaranteed toy the Fourteenth Amendment,
The counterargument of the state was twofold: that the statute in
question was a legitimate exercise of police power, and that it fostered
5
the work of Americanization.
In delivering the majority opinion of the Court which held the
state statute invalid, Mr. Justice IfoBeynolds declared that the liberty
guaranteed toy the Fourteenth Amendment included the right of one to
teach and the right of parents to engage the same to instruct their
6
children according to the dictates of individual conscience* This
case illustrated the liberal conception of the term "liberty". However,
the actual decision went no further than previous decisions had gone
in upholding the right of a man to engage in a lawful occupation without
7
arbitrary or unreasonable restraints toy the state.
On June 1, 1925, the Court gave an even toreader interpretation to
the meaning of the ward "liberty" in the due process clause when it
8
decided the validity of the Oregon Private-School law. The law
provided that all children between the ages of eight and sixteen should
9
attend public school. Two private corporations, Society of Sisters
and Hill Military Academy - challenged the constitutionality of the
statute*




?Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U. S. 478 (1897).
8Fierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510 (1925).
9Itoid.. pp. 530-31.
out that the term "liberty** included the right of parents to direct the
10
upbringing of their children, but no parent was involved as a party to
the case. The parties involved were corporations and the Court had
held that a corporation could not claim protection for "liberty® under
11
the Fourteenth Amendment* Therefore, the Court declared the Oregon
law unconstitutional because it interferred with the property rights of
12
the corporations without due process of law*
B. Freedom of Speech, Press, Eeligion,
Assembly and th© Eight of Counsel
One week after the Court decided upon the Oregon Private-School law,
it considered the constitutionality of a New York statute defining and
punishing criminal anarchy, commonly defined as the doctrine that
13
organized government should be overthrown by force and violence*
Benjamin Gitlow was tried and convicted for violating that law on two
counts: (l) that h@ had knowingly published and circulated a
revolutionary paper, The Left Wing Manifesto, and (2) that he had
advocated and taught the necessity of overthrowing organized government
14
by force and violence. Gitlow*s attorney appealed the case to the
Supreme Court on the contention that the statute in question was
15
repugnant to the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
10Ibid.. p. 534.
Northwestern Life Insurance Co. v. Eigga, 203 U. S. 343, 355 (1906).
This rule was somewhat modified with the Court's acceptance of substantive
due process and the protection of business property.
13268 U. S. 510 (1935).






Historically, that clause had never b@®n interpreted as obligating the
16
several states not to infringe freedom of speech and of press.
In 1907 the Court refused to decide on the applicability of the due
17
process clause in the protection of freedom of speech and of press; In
1920 it alluded to the possibility of the clause being applied Taut did
18
not pass upon it, and in 1923 the Court frankly stated that neither the
Fourteenth Amendment nor any other provision of the Constitution protected
19
freedom of speech and of press from state restriction*
The Supreme Court upheld the New York statute stating that it merely
punished advocacy of "behavior inherently unlawful under a constitutional
30
government. In taking that course of action the Court rejected the
31 22
"clear and present" doctrine, and accepted the "bad tendency test.*
In the obiter dictum., Mr. Justice Sanford delivered an all important
statement which salvaged victory out of defeat:
For the present purpose we may and do assume that freedom of speech
and of press-which are protected by the First Amendment from
abridgement by Congress-are among the fundamental personal rights
and 'liberties1 protected by the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by the states* We do not
regard the incidental statement in Prudential Insurance, Co* v.
Cheek, 859 U. S. 530, 543, that the Fourteenth Amendment imposes
no restrictions on the States concerning freedom of speech, as
determinative of this question.23
16
'Kelly and Harbison, , p. 702.
17
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Schenek v. United States, 249 U. S. 47 (1919).
Chafee, op.clt.. p. 323.
23.
268 U. S. 652 (192?), p. 666.
Th@ decision was an illuminating example of the means by which American
constitutional law grows, and indicated how a dissenting opinion - that
24
of Mr. Justice Harlan in Patterson v. Colorado -at a later data became
35
the majority opinion of the Court,
Justices Holmes and Brandeia ruled against the opinion of the
36
majority and stood by the clear and present danger teat* Justice
Holmes felt that the state law was unconstitutional under that doctrine:
The question in every case is whether the words used are used in
such circumstances and of such a nature so as to create a clear
and present danger that they will bring about the substantive
evil that the State haa a right to prevent*
This case indicated a definite expansion in the word "liberty*1 in the
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, because it was the first
time that the Court had included within its meaning freedom of speech
38
and of press.
Following the Sitlow case the opponents of criminal syndicalism
statutes began to consider the possibility that the Supreme Court might
set aside convictions under these laws. Their hope was realised on
May 16, 193?, when the Court decided upon the constitutionality of th©
39
California Criminal Syndicalism law* That test case was brought
against the California law by Miss Anita Whitney who was arrested for
34
Supra, p. 30.
Charles Warren, "The New Liberty Under the Fourteenth Amendment,"
Harvard.Law Review. XXXIX (1936), 432.
36
Chafee, 0£.j3it., pp. 333-34.
27Gitlow v. New York 368 U. S. 633 (1935), pp. 673-73.
^Charles Warren, "The New Liberty Under the Fourteenth Amendment,"
Harvard Law Heview. XXXIX (1936), 433*
29WMtney v. California, 374 U. S. 357 (193?).
36
taking part in the Communist Labor Party convention. Mr. Justice Sanford,
who spoke for the majority, assumed that the Fourteenth Amendment protected
freedom of speech from state interference, "but contended that her presence
at the Comaunist convention was enough to keep her outside of the shelter
30
given to liberty fey that amendment* Thus, the state law was held to "be
constitutional because freedom of speech did not mean an absolute right
31
to speak without responsibility. Justice Holmes and Brandeis concurred
with the majority, but took pains to point out that Miss Whitney, through
her counsel, should have sought redress under the "clear and present
32
danger11 doctrine.
In the 1930's, other cases followed which confirmed the new
association between the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
and the guarantees of the Bill of Bights. In 1931 the Supreme Court
33
heard and decided the "red flag salute" case, Stromberg v. California.
In that case Tetta Stromberg, a member of the Young Communist League,
was tried and convicted under a California law which condemned the
display of a red flag in public "as a sign, symbol, or emblemn of
34
opposition to organized government.11 Mis9 Stromberg accepted the
instructions of the state court but later made an appeal to the Supreme
Court insisting that the California law placed an unwarranted limitation













The opinion of the Court reiterated its earlier judgment that the
conception of liberty under the Fourteenth Amendment embraced the right
of free speech. The Court went further and held that the section of the
law which forbade the display of a red flag was unconstitutional, because
it was vague and infringed the right of peaceful and orderly opposition
36
to government. In a dissenting opinion (in which Justice Meleynold
concurred) Justice Butler observed that a flag did not talk, and,
3?
therefore, could not come under freedom of speech.
On June 1, 1931, the Supreme Court greatly strengthened the
connection 'between the first eight amendments and the Fourteenth
Amendment. Since 1923 the Court had fostered, largely through pJbJLMr.
dicta, the Fourteenth Amendment as a protector of freedom of speech and
_ 38
of press, hut Near v. Minnesota was the first case in which it
actually passed on the subject. That case was prosecuted under the
Minnesota "newspaper gag law" which provided for the abatement ag a
public nuisance of any "malicious, scandloue, and deflam&tory*1 newspaper,
39
magazine or periodical. In 1927 articles were published in the
Saturday Press charging gross neglect of duty to law-enforcement officers
in connection with gambling, bootlegging, and racketeering. The county
attorney sued to suppress the newspaper and secured a temporary order
forbidding its publication and circulation on the basis that it was
40










trial its manager, Near, demurred to charges on the ground of a lack of
facts. The state Supreme Court affirmed the injunction and, thereafter,
41
Hear appealed the case to the Supreme Court of the United States.
The Court held the Minnesota statute unconstitutional on the
contention that it wag a violation of the freedom of the press which is
43
safeguarded "by the Fourteenth Amendment. In the obiter dictum it was
pointed out that the freedom of press was not an absolute right and the
43
state could punish its abuse. Justices Van Devanter, Mcfieynold,
Sutherland, and Butler dissented. The "Minnesota gag law" case was
significant in the evolutionary development of the nationalization of
civil rights. It represented the first time that the Supreme Court
had flatly invalidated a state law on the ground that it violated one
44
of the liberties enumerated in the Bill of Bights. Furthermore,
the majority opinion, delivered "by Chief Justice Hughes, was supported
45
fey old-time dissenters, Justices Holmes and Brandeis.
Through a careful analysis of the preceding cases which expanded
the meaning of the word "liberty" in the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, it "becomes apparent that protection was extended
only to the civil rights guaranteed by and enumerated in the first
Amendment to the Constitution. In 1932 the Identity between the
guarantees of due process clause, and the guarantees of the first eight









Carr, op.sit.. p. 12 #
'Chafee, on.cit.« pp. 377-78.
46
Amendment, the right of the assistance of counsel.
Powell v. Alabama, the first of the Scottsboro cases, originated
out of the indictment of powell and eight other Negro men for the
alleged rape of two white women in Alabama. After trial for three days,
47
the men were convicted and sentenced to death* Attempts to get a
new trial were denied by the trial court and that judgment was affirmed
by the Supreme Court of Alabama, however, Chief Justice Anderson
48 49
dissented. Thereafter, counsels for Powell applied for and received
a writ of certiorari whereby the Supreme Court of the United States
decided to review the judgment of the state courts.
Powell's counsel assailed the judgment of the state courts
declaring that the defendants had been denied their constitutional
50
rights on three counts: (l) a fair, impartial, and deliberate trial
^Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45 (1932).
47
For a brief but clear analysis of Powell v. Alabama, See Bernard
H. Kelson, The Fourteenth Amendment and the Megro Since 1920 (Washington,
1946), pp. 68»78.
48
In dissenting from the opinion of the majority. Chief Justice
Anderson of the Alabama Supreme Court pointed out that the defendants
were non-residents and had had little time and opportunity to get in
touch with their families and friends. Furthermore, they were not
represented by able counsel, 224 Alabama, 824, 554-55.
49
The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People
employed Clarence Barrow and Garfield Hays to defend Powell and the
others, convicted at Scottsboro, before the Alabama Supreme Court*
When Barrow and Hays arrived in Birmingham they were presented with a
petition signed by all of the men stating that they were not needed.
Following this incident Barrow and Hays were asked to withdraw from the
employment of the NAAGP and appear for the International Labor Defense,
a Comrminist organization* They refused to do this and stated that they
would work with the IK) attorneys provided both organizations withdrew
from the case* The ILD attorneys refused their offer, and the HAACP
and its representatives withdrew from the case. See Clarence Barrow,
"Scottsboro.« The Crisis. XXXIX (March, 1932), 81.
SO.
287 U. S. 45 (1932), p. 50.
40
had not "been afforded? (g) the right of the assistance of counsel had
■been denied; (3) qualified Negroes had been excluded from the juries
that Indicted and convicted Powell. Counsel for Alabama argued that
due process of law should not fee interpreted in such a manner as to
51
restrain the states in their methods of judicial procedures The
state also contended that adequate counsel had teen provided.
The majority opinion was delivered "by Mr. Justice Sutherland.
Although three constitutional issues were presented, the Court chose
to decide the case on one issue, the denial of the right of counsel.
In doing so the @ourt departed from its practice of refusing to invoke
a new constitutional issue whenever a case could be determined on an
52
earlier decision. Precedents had already "been established on the
S3
other two issuess exclusion of Negroes from jury service and on
54
moll-dominated trails. Speaking for the majority, Mr. Justice Sutherland
held that the Sixth Amendment provided that in all criminal cases, the
accused should enjoy the right of counsel, and "it is the duty of the
Court, whether requested or not, to assign counsel11 where the defendant
is -unable to employ one* In reversing the judgement of the state
courts Justice Sutherland ruled that failure to give the defendant®
"reasonable time and opportunity" to secure counsel was a claar denial
51Ipid.. p. 4?.
Nelson, pt>. elt., p. 69.
3The Court had already ruled that the denial to Negroes of the right
to serve on juries was a clear violation of equal protection of the law.
See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U. S. 303 (1879); Virginia v. Rivers,
100 U. S. 31 (1879); Heal v. Delaware, 103 U. S. 370 (1880).
54Mor© v. Dempsey, 261 U. S. 86 (1923).
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45 (1932), p. 71. The decision in this
case was modified in the ruling of Betts v. Brady, Infra, p. 61.
41
I
of due process, and was therefore in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Justices Butler and McBeynold in dissenting opinions, contended that the
defendants had been ably represented by counsel, and the evidence from the
case failed to show the lack of opportunity of the defendants to properly
57
prepare their case*
Powell v. Alabama represented the first time in the history of the
Court that it had twice reversed the decision of a lower court in a case
58
involving capital punishment* The decision in this case was in
59
contradiction to that of Hurtado v. California, where the 0ourt had
refused to identify due process guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment
60
with the full content of the Fifth Amendment*
In 1934 the word "liberty11 in the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment was interpreted to include another of the liberties
guaranteed by the Bill of Bights—freedom of religion. In that case,
61
Hamilton v. Begents of the University of California, the court was
concerned with the validity of a regents order* The order suspended
two students who were conscientious objectors* They had refused to
comply with the state university ruling requiring students to take a
course in military science* The Court assumed that the religious
beliefs of the two students were protected by the due process clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment* But the Court held that since they were
56





*ScottBboro, What Now?11 Mew Republic. LXXXII (April, 1935), 371.
110 U. S. 516 (1884).
60
Kelly and Harbison, 6j>»c_it*, p. 704.
61
393 U. S. 245 (1934).
43
not being compelled to attend the -university, there was no basis for
an assertion of constitutional right to do so without complying with
62
the state's requirement of military training.
In 1936 the Supreme Court of the United States confirmed its
63
position in earlier cases that freedom of press (along with freedom
of speech) was protected from state interference by the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment* In the case at hand, Chrosjean v,
64
American Press Company, the Court was asked to consider a new sort of
restraint on the press: a heavy tax on the newspapers* The state of
Louisiana had, in addition to all other taxes, imposed a two per cent
tax on the gross receipts of any newspaper or magazine engaged in the
selling of advertisements in the state and having a circulation of
68
more than twenty thousand per week. That figure was shrewdly
selected to hit all newspapers opposed to the Huey Long "dictatorship"
66
and exempt all the small papers which supported it. The publishers
involved brought suit in the United States District Court and
received a permanent injunction against the enforcement of the law.
The Attorney General of Louisiana thereupon appealed the decree
of the federal District Court to the Supreme Court of the United States.
The Supreme Court affirmed the decree of the lower court and held the




Gitlow v. New York, Supra, pp. 32-34; Near v, Minnesota, Supra,
pp. 34-5.
6439? U. S. 333 (1936).




freedom of press which was protected against state agression by the due
67
process clause of the Fourteenth .Amendment*
0, The Bevival of Privileges and Immunities
and Colgate v. Harvey
Material in this chapter has "been presented and analyzed to point
up the changed attitude of the Supreme Court in interpreting the
Fourteenth Amendment as an instrument in the protection of civil rights
against state action* The Court's change toward a liberal interpretation
("beginning in 1923) has been true of only the due process clause and
more specifically the word "liberty" in that clause* Unfortunately,
the scone of the privileges and immunities clause had not been widened
68
any further than it was in the Slaughterhouse Cases (1873) • As late
69
as 1934 the Court refused to revive that clause, indicating that the
Fourteenth .Amendment had placed the Federal government only under
obligation to protect those privileges and immunities which appertain
to national citizenship*
Among the guarantees of civil rights contained in the Bill of
Sights, the following have been held (either directly or indirectly)
70
not to be privileges and immunities of federal citizenships the
71
right of suffrage (not a civil right and not in the Bill of Eights);
the right of trial by jury in common law suits guaranteed by Seventh




'Hamilton v. Regents, 293 U. S. 245 (1934).
A more complete list of cases in this respect will be found in the
following article: Pendleton Howard, "She Privileges and Immunities of
Federal Citizenship and Colgate v. Harvey," University of Pennsylvania
law Beview. LXXXVII (1939), 272-73.
71
Minor v., Happeraett, 21,< Wallace'162 (1875) -,
44
72 73
Amendment; the right to tear arms, protected by the Second Amendment;
the prohibition of prosecution of serious crimes except upon a grand
74
jury indictment, contained in the Fifth .Amendment; trial 'by Jury in
75
criminal cases set forth in the Sixth Amendment; the privilege in
criminal cases to 'be confronted toy witnesses, included in the Sixth
76
Amendment; and the freedom from compulsory self-incrimination,
77
afforded by the Fifth Amendment.
For sixty-two years, 1873 to 1935, the Supreme Court had adhered
to the doctrines of the Slaughterhouse cases. It had been generally
supposed by "constitutional commentators that the privileges and
78
iuanunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was a dead letter.*1 But
in 1935 the Supreme Court took a new position with regard to that clause.
The Court*s revival of the privileges and immunities clause came
79
about as the end-product of its decision in Colgate v. Harvey. The
opportunity to broaden the applicability of the privileges and immunities
clause occurred when the Court considered the validity of a Vermont tax
law. The law in question provided that income from money loaned outside of
the state would be taxed at a higher rate than that loaned inside the
72lalker v. Sauvinet, 92 P. S. 90 (1876).
?3Presser v. Illinois, 116 U. S. 252 (1886).
Hurtado v. California, 110 U. S. 516 (1884), decision under due
process.
Maxwell v. Dow, 176 0. S. 581 (1900).
76West v. Louisiana, 194 U. S. 258 (1904),
7?Twining v. Mew Jersey, 211 U. S. 78 (1908).
78_
T»endleton Howard pp«oit., p. 262.
?9296 U. S. 404 (1935).
45
80
state. Colgate, a resident of Vermont, challenged the constitutionality
of the law on the contention that it was discriminatory. Because of the
statute's discriminatory nature, Colgate declared that it violated loth
the equal protection and the privileges and immunities clauses of the
81
Fourteenth Amendment. The Supreme Court accepted the argument of
Colgate. It invalidated the state income tax law on two counts:
(1) that it violated the equal protection of the law, and (2) that it
was an abridgement of a privilege and imosunity of citizens of the
8
United States (the right to carry on business freely across state lines).
There was no precedent for the decision in that case and it was denounced
in a dissenting opinion by Mr. Justice Stone, in which Justices Brandeis
and Cardozo concurred. The novelty of the Court's decision, as well as
its possibilities for the future, were explored by Justice Stone:
Since the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment at least forty-four
cases have been brought to this Court in which state statutes have
been assailed as infringements of the privileges and immunities
clause. Until today none has held that state legislation infringed
that clause. If its sweep were now to be broadened to include
protection of every transaction across state lines, regardless of
its connection with any relationship between the citizen and the
national government, a step would be taken, the gravity of which
might well give us concern....83
Between 1935 and 1940 it seemed as though the Supreme Court would
broaden the applicability of the privileges and immunities clause of
84
the Fourteenth Amendment. In 1939, in Hague v. C.I.O., two Justices
(Black and Roberts) of the majority held that freedom of assembly was
^Cushman, op.cit.. p. 42.
81
Pendieton Howard, op.sit.. p. 273.
82
296 U. S. 404 (1935), p. 404.
83Ibid., pp. 455-46.
84307 U. S. 496 (1939), Infra., pp. 53-4.
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a privilege or immunity of citizens of the United States, ifowever, in
85
1940, in Madden v. Kentucky, the Court overruled the decision of
Colgate v. Harvey and returned to the narrow construction of the
privileges and immunities clause embodied in the Slaughterhouse cases.
In this chapter an attempt has been made to develop into a
meaningful treatment the Supreme Court's interpretation of the
Fourteenth Amendment as an instrument in the protection of civil rights
against state action, from 1923 to 1936. In 1923 the Court shifted
from narrow interpretation in that respect to a liberal one. The
changed attitude of the Court was begun by a broadening of the term
"liberty11 in the due process clause to include a number of the civil
rights enumerated in the Bill of Bights. Between 1933 and 1934 the
word "liberty" was interpreted to include the following rights: tlje
86
right to choose and pursue a lawful vocations the freedom of parents
8?
to direct the upbringing of their children; freedom of speech and of
88 89
press; and freedom of religion. In addition to the broadening of
the due process clause, the Court revived the privileges and immunities
90
clause.
85309 U. S. 83 (1940).
86Meyers v. Nebraska, 862 U. S. 390 (1933).
87Pierce v. Society Of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510 (1925).
88
Gitlow v. New, 268 U. S. 252 (1925); Whitney v. California, 274
U. S. 357 (1927); Stroraberg v. California, 283 U. S. 359 (1931); and
Near v. Minnesota, 283 U. S. 697 (1931),
89Hamilton v. Hegents, 293 U. S. 245 (1934).
^Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U. S. 404 (1935).
CHAPTER IV
NEW ERA IN CIVIL LIBERTIES AFTER 1937
After 193? the Supreme Court was called upon to review a large
number of cases dealing with civil liberties* A majority of the civil
liberty cases involved the constitutionality of state statutes under
the Fourteenth Amendment* In this respect the Court continued the
trend which was 'begun in 1923, and also extended the protection of the
Fourteenth Amendment to a new series of constitutional rights
1
associated with liberty and democracy in a modern society* There
was also developed a new philosophy of judicial review in which
3
three important principles were fused: (l) the primacy of the
liberties guaranteed by the First Amendment; (2) the presumption of
unconstitutionally to any statute which appeared to abridge any of
3 4
those rights; and (3) the doctrine of "clear and present danger".
The new philosophy of judicial review was clearly stated by Mr. Justice
illy and Harbison, op.eit., p. 793.
%obert E. Custoaan (ed*), "Ten Years of Supreme Court: 1937-1947,"
The American Political Science Review, XLII (February, 1948) , 43.
The presumption of unconstitutionality to a statute is an exception
to the principle which had been the governing factor in the judicial
review of legislation for more than a hundred years* In Ogden v. Saunders
12 Wheaton (U. S.) 213 (1827), Mr. Justice Washington stated: "It is but
a decent respect to the wisdom, integrity, and patriotism of the
legislative body, by which any law is passed, to presume in favor of its
validity, until its violation of the Constitution is proved beyond all
reasonable doubt." See Cushman, op.cit.. p. 113.




Rutledg6 in the case of Thomas v. Collins:
Any attempt to restrict those liberties ^freedom of speech, press,
religion, and assemblyj ^mst be justified by a clear public
interest, threatened not doubtfully or remotely, but by a clear
and present danger. The rational connection between the remedy
provided and the evil to be curbed, which in other contexts
might support legislation against attack on due process grounds,
will not suffice. These rights rest on firmer foundation.
Accordingly, whatever occasion would restrain orderly discussion
and persuasion, at appropriate time and place, must have clear
support in public danger, actual or impending. Only the gravest
abuses, endangering paramount interests, give occasion for
permissible limitation.6
The evolution of the new judicial philosophy had undoubtedly been
a concomitant factor to the development of a new court <- the Roosevelt
7
Court," Among other things, that court has been characterized by the
8
presence of a double standard of judicial review. That is, while the
Court was engaged in the process of terminating the application of
substantive due process to state social legislation, it was at the
same time constructing a new law of substantive due process in civil
liberties cases.
The Court's new philosophy of judicial review has been applied
more extensively to cases involving substantive rights - freedom of
speech, religion, press, etc. - than in the area of procedural
rights - right of counsel, trial by jury, etc. In the domain of
procedural due process, especially in state criminal cases, the Court
9
had concerned itself with the fairness of the particular trial.
S333 U. S. 516 (1944).
8Ibid., p. 530.
7C. Herman Pritchett, The Boosevelt Court: A Study in Judicial
Politics and Values. (New York, 1948), pp. 91-93.
8Ibid.. p. 92.
^Charles B. Nutting, "The Supreme Court, the Fourteenth Amendment and
State Criminal Cases," University of Chicago Law Review. Ill (1936) 246,
49
A. Classification of Cases, Palko v. Connecticut
The application of the Fourteenth Amendment to state civil liberties
cases was made possible through a partial identity of that amendment
with the guarantees of the federal Bill of Rights. The first enunciation
10
of that identity was in 1935, in Gitlow v. New York. However, it was
11
reasserted in the following cases: Whitney v. California (1937),
13 13
Stromberg v. California (1931), Near v. Minnesota (1931), Powell v.
14 15
Alabama (1932), Hamilton v. Regents (1934), Grosjean v. American
, 16 17
Press Company, (1936), and Dejonge v. Oregon (1937).
In all of the cases, with the exception of Powell v. Alabama, in
which the Fourteenth Amendment was used to protect the guarantees of the
Bill of Rights, connection was drawn only between that amendment and the
First Amendment. Consequently, there was uncertainty as to whether the
Fourteenth Amendment could be interpreted to include all the civil rights
enumerated in the first eight amendments. That question was partially
18
settled by the Supreme Court in 1937, in Palko v. Connecticut.
In that case, Palko was oanvicted and sentenced to life inprisonment.
Thereafter, the state of Connecticut, in pursuant to a law adopted in
10
11
268 U. S. 652 (1925).
'274 U. S. 357 (1927).
12883 U. S. 359 (1931).
"268 U. B. 697 (1931),
"287 U. S. 45 (1932).
293 U. S. 245 (1934).
'297 U. S. 233 (1936).
299 U. S. 353 (1937). iafra. pp. 48-49,









1866, appealed the case to the Supreme Court of errors* In the new
trial the defendant was found guilty of murder in the first degree and
20
sentenced to death. Counsel for Palko appealed the judgment of the
state court to the Supreme Court of the United States on the contention
that the new trial placed his client twice in jeopardy for the same
offense, and therefore, was in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
He further argued that all rights which the Bill of Eights prohibited
the Federal government from abridging were protected from state
21
interference 'by the Fourteenth Amendment,
Mr. Justice Cardozo, in delivering the opinion of the Court,
affirmed the action, and subsequent judgment of the state* In answer
to the argument of Palko*s counsel, Justice Cardozo stated that the
Fourteenth Amendment did not lESQ__J'act.e. extend to all the civil rights
protected by the first eight amendments* However, the Court held that
the Fourteenth Amendment did protect those rights found to "be "implicit
in the concept of ordered liberty," and those "principles of justice
so rooted in traditions and the conscience of our people as to be
22
ranked as fundamental.11 Furthermore, the opinion of the Court included
a list of the rights which had been previously held as not being
23
protected by that Amendment, namely, indictment by a grand jury, right
19
The law provided that appeals from the rulings and decisions of
the superior court or of any criminal court of common pleas, may be
taken by the state, with permission of the presiding judge, to the
Supreme Court of Errors, in the same manner and to the same effect as
if made by the accused. See Connecticut General Statutes, section 6494*





23Hurtado v. California, 110 U. S. 619 (1884).
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24 35
of trial by jury, protection against unreasonable searches and seissures,
36
and protection against compulsory self-incrinsination. It is interesting
to note that the classification of cases set forth in Palko v. Connecticut
was divided into two groups; those dealing with substantive due process
27
on the one hand and those involving procedural due process on the other.
Historically, the Fourteenth Amendment had been expanded to cover the
former group, "but only once Powell v. Alabama, had it been interpreted
to protect a right included in the latter group. The opinion of the
Co-urt in that case appeared to restrict the applicability of the
Fourteenth Amendment in state civil liberties cases. On the contrary,
after 1937, the Court expanded the applicability of that amendment to a
whole new series of constitutional rights*
B. Freedom of Speech, Press, Religion, Assembly
and the Revival of Clear and Present Danger
28
In DeJonge v. Oregon the Court was presented with an opportunity
to include the freedom of assembly under the protection of the Fourteenth
Amendment. That case originated out of the indictment and conviction
29
of Dirk DeJonge for violating the Oregon Criminal Syndicalism law. The
24Walker v. Bauvinet, 92 U. S. 90 (1876); Maxwell v. Dow, 176
U. S. 581 (1900).
35Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. (1914).
26Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. (1908),
27j>or a gimiiar classification see Balssac v. Porto Rico. 258
U. S. 398 (1922).
TleJonge v. Oregon, 299 flf. S. 353 (1937). For an analysis of this
case see "High Court Upsets Oregon Sentence of a Communist", New York
Times. January 5, 1937, Sect. 1, p. 1.
29Criminal Syndicalism was defined as the "doctrine which advocates
crime, physical violence, sabotage or any unlawful act or method as a
means of effecting industrial or political change or revolution."
Oregon Code. 1930, sections 14-3110.
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charge was that he had assisted in the conduct of a meting which was
called under the auspices of the^unist Party, an organisation
advocating criminal syndicalism. After having received a sentence
of seven years imprisonment, DeJonge made an appeal to the Supreme
Court contending that the Oregon law was in violation of the Fourteenth
•Amendment*
Mr. Chief Justice Hughes, in delivering the unanimous opinion of
the Court, held the Oregon statute unconstitutional on the ground that
it was a curtailment of both freedom of speech and of assembly/2 iB
outlining the scope of the free speech and free assembly, the Chief
Justice stated:
Three ninths after the DeJonge case, the Court decided, the case
of Hemdon v. I*wery. m that case, the first sedition case to come
from the South, the Court took steps toward the revival of the «clear
and present danger* doctrine. The case of Hemdon v. *>wery arose out
of the arrest and conviction of Angelo Hemdon, a Negro Communist
organic, in Atlanta, Georgia. He was arrested for distributing
Ibid., p. 368.63.
Ibid,, p. 365.
34301 U. S. 34a (1937).
36,
Chafee, oj^cj^., p. 388.
53
Communistic literature, and for having in his possession a pamphlet,
Ths Communist Position on the NeggQ fotestipn, which advocated the
36
establishment of a "Black Belt11 republic in the South. Herndon was
37
convicted for violating an ancient Georgia anti-insurrection statute.
After a period of imprisonment, he applied for a writ of habeas corpus.
His request was denied by the Georgia Supreme Court, and he thereupon
filed an appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States,
Mr. Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court which held
the Georgia law unconstitutional on two counts: that the law applied
40
38
in the case was an unwarrantable invasion of the right of free speech,
and that the law as construed to punish mere bad tendency constituted a
39
violation of due process of law. Justices Van Devanter, McBeynolds,
Sutherland, and Butler, dissenting, argued that the revolutionary
tendency of the appelant's conduct was punishable under the Georgia law.
In addition to being applied to limitations on the freedom of
speech and of assembly, the clear and present danger doctrine was applied
41
to contempt of court and freedom of speech in Bridges v. California.
In that case Barry Bridges, a labor leader, was convicted for contempt
of court because he commented upon a case still pending. In delivering
36,
37,
'301 U. S. 243 (1937).
The Georgia anti-insurrection statute was inspired by the Nat
Turner insurrection (1332), But it was first used against Communist
organizers, i.e., Angelo Herndon and Mary Dalton, over a hundred years
after that incident. See Ch&fee, op.cit., pp. 388-90•
38






314 U. S. 252 (1940).
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54
th© opinion of the Court which reversed the judgment of the state court,
Mr. Justice Black cited th© "clear and present danger" doctrine and
held that the evils in prospect must be both substantial and serious.
He further pointed oat that the "assumption that respect for the
judiciary can "be won "by shielding judges from published criticism
43
wrongly appraises the character of American public opinion."
44
In Hague v. C.1,0. the right of peaceable assembly, which had
"been identified with the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
45
in DeJonge v. Oregon, was reasserted. Jersey City, Hew Jersey had an
ordinance which provided that permits should be secured from a director
46
of public safety "before public meetings could be held. The C.I.O.
brought suit in the United States District Court to enjoin the mayor
from enforcing the ordinance. An injunction was granted, and thereafter,
the city officials appealed the dears© to a higher court.
After reviewing the case the Court, by a vote of five to two, held
the ordinance unconstitutional and affirmed the decree of the lower court,
The majority of the Court waa divided three ways. Justice Hoberts and
Black felt that the ordinance was invalid because it abridged a privilege
Ibid., p. 363.
43
Ibid,., p. S70. See also Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U. S. 331 (1946).
44
307 U. S. 496 (1939). Back of this case the state of Hew Jersey
had a long history of industrial conflicts. Its industries had been
unionized slower than those of neighboring New York City. The unions
were constantly attempting to introduce the closed shop. The mayor of
Jersey City, Frank Hague, chose to fight the closed shop with a closed
city. It is interesting to not© that not only labor leadasrs were denied
permits to hold public meetings, but other people like Roger Baldwin and
Norman Thomas were deniad permits. However, the supporters of Hague could
always obtain permits. See Chafee, ojucit., pp. 409-11.
45.
46
'399 U. S. 353 (1937).
307 U. S. 496 (1939), p. 503.
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47
or immunity of citizens of the United States - the right of peaceable
assembly. Justices Stone and Heed protested against the use of the
privileges and immunities clause and held that the ordinance was a
48
violation of due process of law. Chief Justice Hughes concurred in
part with both opinions, tut he tended to agree with the opinion of
Stone and Heed. In addition to the three opinions in the majority,
there were two dissenting opinions, those of McEeynold and Butler.
MC&eynolds argued that wise management of local affairs was outside of
49
the jurisdiction of the federal court.
50
In 1941, in Cox v. New Hampshire, the Supreme Court held that the
freedom of assembly was not an absolute right and therefore was not
immune to reasonable regulation. That case originated out of the
conviction of five Jehovah witnesses for violating a state statute
51
which prohibited parades upon public streets without a special license.
In delivering the opinion of the Court which upheld the state statute,
Mr. Chief Justice Hughes observed that civil liberties, as guaranteed
by the Constitution, implied "the existence of an organized society
maintaining public order without which liberty itself would be lost in
52
the excess of unrestrained abuses*"
In addition to protecting the civil rights enumerated in the Bill











by the Fourteenth Amendment. An outstanding example of that new tendency
was the interpreting of peaceful picketing as a form of free speech.
That new liberty was first alluded to in the majority opinion ia Senn
53
v. Tile Layers Union. Mr. Justice Brandeis, speaking for the majority
stated:
Clearly the means which the statute {[Wisconsin law legalizing
peaceful picketing^ authorizes - picketing and publicity . are not
prohibited by the Fourteenth Amendment. Members of a union might,
without special statutory authorization by a state, make known the
facts about a labor dispute, for freedom of speech is guaranteed
by the Federal Constitution.54
Brandeis1 statement in the Senn case was accepted and confirmed in
55
Thornhill v. Alabama. In that case, Byron Thornhill was convicted for
violating an anti-^ieketing statute. The statute prohibited any person
"without jxist cause" to go near or loiter about any place of lawful
56
business. Following conviction Thornhill appealed the case to the
Supreme Court, Speaking through Mr. Justice Murphy, the Court held tha
Alabama statute unconstitutional on the ground that it abridged both free
5?
speech and free assembly. He further contended that "the dissemination
of information concerning the facts of a labor dispute must be regarded
as within that area of free discussion that is guaranteed by the
58
Constitution...•** In a later ease, Milk Wagon Drivers Union v.
59
Meadowmoor Dairies, the Supreme Court pointed out that the right to
53
301 U. S. 468 (1937).
P. 478.







312 U. S. 287 (1941).
picket was not an absolute right. In that case it held that a state
court might lawfully enjoin picketing marked by violence and distraction
60
of property.
C. Freedom of Eeligion and Jehovah*a Witnesses Cases
After 1937 the Supreme Court added decisions of greater importance
to the case law of religious freedom than had been accumulated in all
61
years since the adoption of the Bill of Bights, Those cases, in which
the freedom of press was merged with the freedom of religion, were
"brought "before the court by the Jehovah's Witnesses (a minority religious
63
sect). Of the twenty-five cases that the Jehovah's Witnesses "brought
before the Court, between 1937 and 1947, only four will be analyzed here:
63
The first Jehovah's Witnesses' case, Lovell v. Griffin; the one in
which the freedom of religion was explicitly affirmed, Cantwell v,
64
Connecticut; and the most spectacularly controversial, Minervilie
65




^Victor W. Rotnem and F. G. Folsom, Jr,, "Recent Restrictions
Spon Religious Liberty," American Political Science Review XXXVI
(December, 1942), 1053.
62The Jehovah's Witnesses are followers of the religious doctrines
formulated by the late Charles T. Russell. Pastor Russell was born in
Pittsburg in 1853 and was brought up in the Presbyterian faith. At the
age of sixteen, he decided that the then existing schools of religious
thought were wrong, and built up a religion of his own, centered around
calculations as to the seeond coming of Christ and the battle of
Armageddon. His followers adopted the name of Jehovah*s Witnesses in
1931. See Rotnem and Folsom, op.cit., pp. 1055-5?.




!310 U. S. 396 (1940).
310 U. S. 586 (1940).
319 U. S. 624 (1943).
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The first of the Jehovah's Witnesses1 cases, Lovell v. Griffin,
arose out of the conviction of Alma. Lovell for violating a Griffin,
Georgia ordinance. The ordinance prohibited the distributing of
leaflets and handbooks without first obtaining written permission from
€8
the city manager* Upon conviction the defendant sued out a writ of
error to the Supreme Court* Chief Justice Hughes, who spoke for a
unanimous court, held the Griffin ordinance unconstitutional on the
69
ground that it violated freedom of speech and of press. He further
stated that the character of the ordinance was such "that it strikes
at the very foundation of the freedom of press by subjecting it to
70
license and censorship*tt
A similar position was adopted by the Court in Cantwell v.
71
Connecticut. In that case the Court explicitly ruled upon state
73
action and freedom of religion* That case originated out of the
violation of a state law prohibiting solicitation of money for
religious causes without the prior approval of the local secretary of
73
public welfare. Cantwell was convicted on two counts: (l) soliciting
74
without reguired certificate, and (2) inciting a breach of peace*




71310 U. S. 396 (1940).
72In Hamilton v. Regents, 8U]3ra, p. 40, there was intimated in the
opinion of the Court that the freedom of religion came under the due
process of law clause.
73310 U. S. 301-03.
Cantwell1s street corner phonograph reaital had attacked
institutionalised religion and had aroused the ire of a Catholic
audience. See fiotnem and Folsom, o-p.cit., pp. 1057-58.
The unanimous opinion of the Court, delivered "by Mr. Justice Roberts
75
invalidated the state law as a violation of religious liberty. After
recognizing the general right of the state to regulate solicitation,
Justice Roberts denounced the censorship power of the secretary as a
76
clear and obvious abridgement of the freedom of religion and conscience.
While some of the issues involved in Jehovah's Witnessess cases
have been settled easily, others have been controversial. For example,
of the sixteen cases decided "between 1937 and 1942,, the Court has
77 78
reversed itself twice, divided five to four in three case, and six
79
to three in another, and produced some twenty-seven opinions.
The most controversial of the Jehovah's Witnesses cases were the
89
"flag salute cases" - Minerville School District v. Gobitis, and
81
West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, The Minerville
ease arose out of the refusal of the children of Walter Gobitiss a
Jehovah's Witness, to comply with a state law which required all
children in public schools to salute the flag of the United States and
82
recite the pledge of allegiance. Upon refusal to do so the children
75310 U. S. 296 (1940), pp. 300-01.
76Ibid., pp. 303-04. It was pointed out that the First and
Fourteenth Amendments embraced two concepts with respect to religion -
freedom to believe and freedom to act. The first is an absolute right
and the second is not*
?7Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U. S. 105 (1943); West Virginia
State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 579 (1943).
78Jones v. Opelika, 316 U. S. 584 (1943); Murdock v. Pennsylvania,
319 U. S. 105 (1943); Martin v. Struther, 319 U. S. 141 (1943).
West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U. S.
579 (1943).
80
310 U. S. 586 (1940).
81319 U. S. 579 (1943).
82
310 U. S. 586 (1940).
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were expelled from school* Gototie, their father, applied to a Federal
District Court for an injunction agaixst enforcement of the expulsion
order* The injunction was granted toy the District Court and sustained
by the Circuit Court of Appeals (third circuit)*
The opinion of the Court, delivered by Mr* Justice Frankfurter,
reversed the decisions of the lower courts and upheld the state law*
Justice Frankfurter held that th® law was constitutional because the
84
interests of the state were more fundamental than minority rights.
Furthermore, he added that the flag salute was intended to build up a
85
sentiment of national unity which is the base of national security*
The decision in this case was out of harmony with the spirit of the
Court in broadening the area of civil rights and the protection of
86
minority rights against state coercion*
8?
In 1943, in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Earnette,
the Court overruled the Gobitis decision and declared unconstitutional
a West Virginia statute essentially the same as the Pennsylvania rule*
Speaking for the majority, Mr. Justice Jackson stated that "the freedom
asserted by the appellees does not bring them into collision with rights
88
asserted by any other individual*11 He also added, "censorship or
suppression of opinion is tolerated by our Constitution only when the
89











denounced the majority opinion of the Court stating that it attempted
90
to substitute judicial decree in the place of legislative function.
D. Procedural Due Process in Criminal Cases
It has been stated that the Supreme Court between 193? and 1947
91
was a "Bill of Bights Court". That statement was totally valid in so
far as substantive rights were concerned, and partially valid in the
consideration of procedural rights. The Court has consistently seen
to it that the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh and Eighth Amendments
93
were enforced in Federal courts. In state criminal cases Involving
procedural due process, the Supreme Court has concerned itself with the
93
fairness of a particular trial. The Court's criterion of the fairness
of state cases involving criminal due process has centered around the
following principles! prohibition of forced confessions, the right of
counsel, and the representative character of juries.
94
In 1940, in the case of Chambers v. Florida, the Supreme Court
held that forced confessions, "third degree11, were in violation of due
process of law. That case originated out of the conviction of Chamber®
and three other Megroes for the alleged murder of a white man in
Florida. The confession was received after the defendants had been
kept in custody and questioned, one by one, with no opportunity between
95
grilling to obtain rest or sleep, for five days and night®. After
Ibid*
Pritehett, oj>4ci£., p. 137.
9 - •!., p. 13?
93Nutting, ojg^cit., p. 246.




"being sentenced to death, counsel for the defendants appealed the case
to the Supreme Court on the contention that his clients had been denied
du® process of law. In delivering the opinion of the Court which set
aside the state conviction, Mr, Justice Jackson stated;
We are not impressed "by the argument - that enforced methods such
as those under review are necessary to uphold our laws....Due
process of law, preserved for all by our Constitution, coraaands
that no such practice as that disclosed "by this record shall
send any accused to his death.-6
97
In 1942, in the ease of Bette v, Brady, the Court modified its
98
ruling in an earlier case, Powell v. Alabama. Norman Betts, the
defendant, was indicted for robbery in Maryland, Due to financial
inability, Betts requested the court to appoint counsel for him. His
request wag denied on the ground that it was not customary in Maryland
to provide counsel for indigent defenders, except in prosecutions for
99
murder and rape. Upon conviction Betts appealed his case to the Supreme
Court.
Speaking through Mr. Justice fiobertsg the Court affirmed the
judgment of the state court and held that due process of law does not
under all circumstances compel a state to appoint counsel at state
100
expanse for any indigent defendant. Justice Roberts further added?
Asserted denial is to be tested by an appraisal of the totality of
facts in a given case. That which may, in one setting, constitute
a denial of fundamental fairness, shocking to the universal sense
of justice, may, in other circumstances, and in the light of other
consideration, fall short of such denial.101
96
P» 241,
97316 U. S. 455 (1942).
98









The reasoning of the majority was denounced "by Justices Black, Douglas
and Murphy on the ground that the refusal of the state provide the
defendant with a counsel was a clear violation of due process of law*
Another aspect of criminal due process which has received much
attention from the Supreme Court after 1937 is the representative character
of juries* Usually this question has been raised by the absence of Negroes
from Juries in the South. Precedents for these cases date "back to 1879«
In that year a West Virginia statute requiring Juries to be composed
exclusively of white male citizens was declared unconstitutional on the
ground that it violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
103 104
Amendment. This was reasserted in 1935, in Norris v. Alabama,
the second seottsboro case, and further enforced by the "Eoosevelt Court*11
105
In the case of Smith v. Texas, the Court set aside a state
conviction on the ground that Negroes had been discriminated against*
The county Jiary commissioner in a county where the Negro population was
over twenty per cent, denied that there was any discrimination against
Negroes, and explained that the reason why only 5 of the 384 Jurors
serving over a period of eight years were Negroes was because "he was
not personally acquainted with any member of the Negro rac@9w Assuming
that this story was true, the Court pointed out that for a Jury
commissioner to limit jurors to his personal acquaintances was in itself
a discriminatory procedure.
106
The case of Adamson v. California further indicated the nature
102
'Ibid., pp. 474-77.
103Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 0, S. 303 (1879).
104294 U. S. 587 (1935).
^J?311 U. S. 128 (1940).
106332 U. S. 46 (1947).
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of the Courts criterion of a fair trial* In that case the Supreme
Court was called upon to consider th© constitutionality of a
California statute which permitted comment by the trial court on the
failure of a defendant to testify and permitted the jury to consider
the same. The Court upheld the state law and the conviction thereunder
on the ground that the guarantee against self-incrimination is not
included in due process of law except where such would restilt in an
107
unfair conviction, or where the testimony is obtained through
108
"fear of hurt, torture, or exhaustion," In a separate concurring
opinion, Mr. Justice Frankfurter stated that he supported the ruling
109
in Twining v. New Jersey in reference to state criminal cases, and
due process. He further pointed out in state criminal cases, natural
law provided a better "basis for decision and "a much longer and much
better founded justification1* than "subjective" selections from tae
110






U. S. 78 (1908).
U0Adamson v. California, 332 U. S. 46 (1947), p. 65.
CONCLUSION
Historically, the Fourteenth Amendment has been subject to various
interpretations. Since 1873, no other part of the Constitution of the
United States has been the source of as much litigation as the Fourteenth
■Amendment. In view of the fact that this amendment has often "been the
source of litigation, it has "been interesting to observe and analyze
the extent to which the Supreme Court has interpreted it in accordance
with the intended prupose of its framers.
According to Bepresentative John A. Bingham, the Fourteenth
Amendment, particularly, the first section - and this section in effect
is the amendment- was formulated to protect civil rights from the
various states. This was to 'be done by bringing the full weight of
the guarantees of civil rights enumerated in the Bill of Sights to bear
upon state activities endangering civil liberty. It is important to
note, however, that in 1873, and for fifty years afterwards, the
Supreme Court refused to accept the intended purpose of this amendment.
The Court was more concerned with interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment
as a means of protecting business property from state regulation.
In 1983, the Supreme Court, through the acceptance of a changed
conception of due process of law, began to give a liberal interpretation
to the Fourteenth Amendment. This liberal interpretation was made
possible by associating the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
with the guarantees of th© first eight amendments, especially, the First
Amendment. The liberal interpretation of this amendment was concerned
65
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largely with a reinterpretation of due process of law, however, the
privileges and immunities clause received a brief revival (from
1935 to 1940).
After 1937, the Supreme Court consistently reasserted the liberal
interpretation of the Fourteenth .Amendment which isas began in the 1920's.
In addition to this, the Court discovered new liberties (peaceful
picketing, contempt of court, etc.) which might be protected under the
amendment. The new era in civil liberties, after 1937, has been
conditioned by the evolution of a new court, the so-called "Boosevelt
Court." A concomitant factor of the evolution of a new court has been
the development of a new philosophy of judical review with regard to
civil liberty cases, at least, in cases involving substantive rights.
This new doctrine provided that the guarantees of the First Amendment -
freedom of speech, press, religion, and assembly - are important that
legislative restrictions upon them will be presumed to be unconstitutional
unless shown to be justified by a clear and present danger. In the
domain of procedural due process and state criminal cases, the
application of the Fourteenth Amendment has been less extensive.
The Supreme Court's interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment,
in regard to civil rights, may be classified into two groups, substantive
and procedual. In the area of substantive rights the Court has been
consistant in its application of that amendment. It has interpreted the
Fourteenth Amendment as a means of protecting the following rights from
state encroachments freedom of speech (including peaceful picketing
and contempt of court), press, religion, and assembly. In the area of
procedural rights the Court has been reluctant to apply the Fourteenth
Amendment unless there has been an unfair administration of Justice.
The Court*s criterion of fairness in state criminal cases has been
67
centered around the following principles? the right of counsel,
prohibition of forced confessions, and the representative character
of juries. In the final analysis the writer is inclined to conclude
that the Supreme Court has never fully interpreted the Fourteenth
Amendment in accordance with its intended purpose - protection of
civil rights against state action.
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